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I. INTRODUCTION
onsider the following situation: you are a woman seeking medical
advice about eliminating facial wrinkles. You decide to proceed
with a process in which you are injected with Zyderm, an anti-
wrinkle treatment containing collagen which has been approved by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The intended result is a smooth-
ing out of wrinkles or deformities on the skin surface. The actual result,
however, is certainly not one that you had anticipated. Shortly after re-
ceiving the injections, you start experiencing a severe pain in your mus-
cles and joints. Suddenly, you are diagnosed with dermatomyositis/
polymyositis (DM/PM). It appears that, although your wrinkles may
have improved, you have paid a high price: you are suffering from a rela-
tively rare autoimmune disease in which your immune system identifies
its own skin and muscle tissue as foreign and attacks them. The anti-
wrinkle products have attached to your tissues and have provoked an im-
mune response that has destroyed your body tissue.
Suppose that you then seek legal recourse against the manufacturer of
this product to recover damages you have suffered. If nothing else, you
seek compensatory damages to cover your medical expenses. Your action
is based on defective design, inadequate warnings, and negligent failure
to warn. Since the product is regulated by the FDA, however, your claim
in state court is preempted. As the product was approved by the FDA,
you are faced with two grim facts: the manufacturer of Zyderm is
shielded from liability, and thus you have no recourse against the manu-
facturer because the court system is not permitted to find that the FDA's
requirements were not extensive enough.
This fact scenario has occurred in the First Circuit in King v. Collagen
Corp.1 and in the Fifth Circuit in Stamps v. Collagen Corp.2 The implica-
tions of these two cases are far-reaching. In fact, Peter Hutt, former gen-
eral counsel of the FDA, has stated that "[t]his case [King v. Collagen
Corp.] is probably the single most important case to the medical-device
industry in American history."' 3 With Stamps having a nearly identical
fact scenario to that in King, the two cases are crucial to understanding
whether the public is adequately protected by the FDA with regard to
1. 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993).
2. 984 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993).
3. Edward Felsenthal & Lee Berton, FDA Approval Shields Firms in Injury Suits,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1993, at B1.
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medical devices. The question is whether the FDA, a federal regulatory
agency, is capable of achieving the goals of public health and safety by
preempting state law claims regarding medical devices. Opponents of
preemption argue that allowing state tort actions would better achieve
both the federal and state governments' objectives of public safety in
spite of the fact that the threat of such litigation would certainly interfere
with medical device manufacturers' willingness to introduce new products
into the marketplace.
Thus, the arguments for and against preemption represent opposing
views regarding the roles that both the federal and state governments
should play in the regulation of medical devices. The overriding concern
at both levels of government is that of public health and safety. That is,
the objectives are to ensure that only safe and effective products reach
the consumer and that the consumer is adequately informed how to safely
use a particular product. The focus of this paper will center upon
whether preemption furthers public safety as the federal government ad-
vocates, or, on the other hand, whether it hinders this crucial objective at
the public's expense.
In order to understand this debate in its entirety, I will first discuss the
FDA's process of regulating medical devices. Next, I will explore pre-
emption in general terms. I will then discuss the arguments for and
against preemption in light of the case law involving medical devices, with
a particular emphasis on cases involving Class III devices. Finally, I will
draw a conclusion regarding how best to achieve a balance between con-
sumer protection and the regulatory role of governmental agencies.
II. THE FDA'S REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES
A. HISTORY OF THE REGULATIONS CONCERNING MEDICAL DEVICES
The statutory definition of a "medical device" is quite broad. 4 Section
321(h) of 21 U.S.C. provides:
The term "device" . . . means ... [that which is] intended for use in
the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitiga-
tion, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or
other animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended pur-
poses through chemical action within or on the body of man or other
animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the
achievement of its primary intended purposes. 5
In essence, any item advanced for a medical purpose that does not rely on
chemical or metabolic action to reach its desired result is considered to be
a medical device. 6 Continued advances in the medical field and in tech-
nology have led to an increased availability of medical devices, benefiting
4. David A. Kessler et al., The Federal Regulation of Medical Devices, 317 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 357, 357 (1987).




both physicians and consumers. In 1990, studies estimated that approxi-
mately 5000 medical devices are introduced into the market every year.7
Medical devices comprise an industry worth billions of dollars in annual
sales; in 1988, the figure had reached twenty billion by some accounts.8
Furthermore, over 7000 manufacturers make available to the American
medical profession approximately 1700 different types of medical devices,
which include over 50,000 separate products.9 As a result, many lifesav-
ing devices have become available to the public. On the other hand,
these new devices have periodically harmed the public, as they have given.
rise to injuries due to defects. In the first year alone that the FDA re-
quired mandatory reporting, medical devices were linked to approxi-
mately 18,000 deaths and illnesses.10 Although this number seems
surprisingly high, it has been estimated that less than half of the problems
related to medical devices had been reported to device manufacturers
before mandatory reporting was implemented."
While not underestimating the benefits the medical device industry be-
stows upon the American economy, Congress has striven to protect con-
sumers from harm caused by defective or ineffective medical devices. 12
The regulation of medical devices is certainly not an arbitrary concern of
the government, since it is imperative that physicians can rely on safe and
effective devices for their patients. 13 As a result, Congress has enacted
numerous statutes regulating the medical device industry. In 1938, the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) provided the FDA with re-
stricted authority to govern the medical device industry.' 4 The FDA, an
agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, has as
its primary objective "the protection of the public from potential health
hazards resulting from adulterated 15 and mislabeled' 6 foods, cosmetics,
medical devices and drugs.' 7
7. H.R. REP. No. 808, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 6307.
8. James S. Benson et al., The FDA's Regulation of Medical Devices: A Decade of
Change, 43 FoOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 495, 496 (1988).
9. Kessler et al., supra note 4, at 357-58.
10. Susan M. Mesner, Medical Device Technology: Does Federal Regulation of This
New Frontier Preempt the Consumer's State Common Law Claims Arising from Injuries
Related to Defective Medical Devices?, 7 J. L. & HEALTH 253, 254 (1992-1993); see also
H.R. REP. No. 808, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6305, 6311.
11. Mesner, supra note 10, at 254.
12. Id. at 255.
13. David M. Steinhaus, How Should FDA Regulation of Devices Change?, 48 FoOD &
DRUG L.J. 709, 709 (1993).
14. FD&C Act, Pub. L. 75-717, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994)).
15. An "adulterated" device is one that is characterized by insanitary storage, packag-
ing, or manufacturing conditions. 21 U.S.C. § 351(a) (1994).
16. A device is "misbranded" if its labeling is false or misleading in any way. Id.§ 352(a). Additionally, a device is "misbranded" if it does not specify adequate directions
for use. Id. § 352(f).
17. Mesner, supra note 10, at 266.
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With the introduction of such items as contraceptive devices-in partic-
ular, intrauterine devices (IUDs) and cardiac pacemakers-into the mar-
ketplace in the 1960s came the need for more extensive regulation.' 8
These devices were seen as more dangerous than the majority of previ-
ously introduced devices since they "are implanted into consumers' bod-
ies and present an enormous potential risk."'19 The objective of such
additional controls was to ensure that these new products would be
proven safe and effective before reaching the public.20 The late 1960s
marked the beginning of a decade in which numerous consumer protec-
tion laws were enacted. In fact, of forty-seven federal consumer protec-
tion laws enacted between 1891 and 1972, only twenty-one were enacted
in the first seventy-five years; the remaining twenty-six laws were enacted
between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s.21 This ten-year period is often
referred to as the "consumer decade. '22 It was at the conclusion of this
decade that the FDA sought to introduce a more comprehensive, yet not
too rigid, legislative scheme for regulating medical devices. In 1976, Con-
gress implemented its new regulatory plan, embodied in the Medical De-
vice Amendments (MDA) of 1976.23 The MDA of 1976 were then
amended by both the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 (SDMA) and the
MDA of 1992.24 Additionally, the FDA has implemented various far-
reaching federal regulations related to medical devices. 25
Despite the vast array of regulations whose goal is to protect consum-
ers from injuries related to defects in medical devices, consumers remain
susceptible to injuries stemming from defects and dangers of medical de-
vices.26 The fact that Congress and the FDA have implemented so many
18. Bianca I. Truitt, Commentary, Injured Consumers and the FDA: Should Federal
Preemption Protect Medical Device Manufacturers Under a Quasi-Governmental Immu-
nity?, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 155, 156 (1994).
19. Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right Direc-
tion Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 511, 512 (1988).
20. Benson et al., supra note 8, at 495.
21. Adler, supra note 19, at 511 n.3.
22. Id.; see also Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A
Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32, 34 (1982).
23. FD&C Act, Pub. L. 75-717, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended by Medical
Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539, Safe Medical Devices Act of
1990, Pub. L. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511, and Medical Device Amendments of 1992, Pub. L.
102-300, 106 Stat. 239. The MDA of 1976 were enacted in large part due to findings of the
Cooper Committee. Benson et. al, supra note 8, at 496. In 1969, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare formed the committee, comprising representatives of the
health care as well as medical technology fields. Id. This panel was responsible for review-
ing the need for more specific medical device legislation. Id. The Committee based its
decisions on evaluations by medical professionals, the industry, and consumers. Id.; see S.
Rep. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070-1076.
As a result, it recommended further legislation to provide for standard setting and pre-
market clearance for medical devices. Id.
24. FD&C Act, supra note 23.
25. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 800-895 (1994).
26. At the hearing of the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment on Novem-
ber 6, 1989, General Accounting Office Comptroller General Charles A. Bowsher de-
clared: "[O]ur work reveals several shortcomings in both the premarket review and
postmarket surveillance systems for medical devices and raises serious questions about the
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regulations in the hopes of protecting consumers when, in actuality, inju-
ries continue to occur, is of major concern to the government, to the med-
ical profession, and to the public.
B. THE MEDICAL DEVICES AMENDMENTS OF 1976
The heart of the MDA is a regulatory scheme that allows for prospec-
tive evaluation. The rationale underlying the proposal for the MDA of
1976 was "the need to overcome deficiencies in the existing Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which allowed the FDA to initiate regulatory
action against a hazardous medical device only after it was in commercial
use and after it was demonstrated to be misbranded or adulterated. '27
Thus, the 1976 amendments broadened the FDA's regulation of con-
sumer and medical products with the hopes of increasing consumer pro-
tection and thus furthering the federal objectives of public health and
safety.
The three goals of the MDA are to: "(1) assure public protection
against unsafe and ineffective devices; (2) ensure that health practitioners
can be confident about the medical equipment they use or prescribe for
their patients; and (3) provide market protection for pioneers of new
medical technologies. '28 In other words, the MDA strive to protect inno-
vation and advancement of certain medical devices from severe govern-
mental restrictions29 while concurrently protecting consumers against
unsafe and ineffective products.
The MDA are uncommonly prescriptive as they specify to a remarka-
ble degree the different procedures that must be followed in order to
market a device.30 The necessary procedures required to market a partic-
ular device are determined according to the classification of that device.
Each device may belong to one of three classes. The FDA is responsible,
with the aid of nongovernmental experts, for classifying devices entering
the market into the category that will offer the minimum level of regula-
tion necessary to ensure their safety and effectiveness. 31 Although the
decision as to classification rests with the FDA, the MDA permit a manu-
facturer to petition for a device to be reclassified into a less-regulated
class. 32
Class I devices merely require general controls. 33 By the terms of the
MDA, the devices in this class are to be subjected only to general con-
trols, provided that (1) such controls are adequate to supply a reasonable
ability of these systems and related regulations to protect the American people from un-
safe and ineffective medical devices." H.R. REP. No. 808, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 n.1
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 6308 n.1.
27. Benson et al., supra note 8, at 496.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 496-97.
31. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a),(b) (1994).
32. Id. § 360c(d)(1).
33. Benson et al., supra note 8, at 497.
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assurance of safety and effectiveness, and that (2) the purpose of the de-
vice is not to support or prolong human life or significantly act as an
impairment to human health, and does not introduce a potentially unrea-
sonable risk of illness or injury.34 Class I controls apply to medical de-
vices in all three categories. 35 Examples of controls include pre-market
notification, reporting, registration and listing, adulteration, misbranding,
and banning. 36 Medical devices that fall into this category include tongue
depressors, elastic bandages, ice bags and bed pans.37
Class II includes devices for which safety performance standards 38 may
be required because Class I controls are inadequate. 39 A prerequisite for
placing devices into this category is that sufficient information exist to
establish special controls to provide assurance of the safety and effective-
ness of the device. 40 Class II medical devices include bone plates, hearing
aids, syringes, resuscitators, and electrocardiograph electrodes. 41
The most regulated class, Class III, requires pre-market approval be-
cause the controls of Class I are inadequate and insufficient information
prevents the establishment of a safety performance standard. 42 Pre-mar-
ket approval acts as an assurance that devices with the greatest potential
risk do not enter the market until their safety and effectiveness have been
thoroughly demonstrated through both laboratory and clinical testing.43
Such testing is crucial since a device in this class is "purported or repre-
sented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use
which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human
health, or [the device] presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or
injury." 44 Devices in this class include pacemakers, IUDs, artificial joints,
and artificial hearts. 45
The SDMA of 1990 and the MDA of 1992, enacted to complement the
MDA of 1976, prescribe, among other things, more stringent reporting
requirements by manufacturers and users for device-related injuries. 46
Furthermore, the 1990 amendment substitutes an assortment of "special
controls" for Class II devices which may be prescribed in place of or in
addition to the prior "performance standards" approach imposed under
34. May G. Boguslaski, Classification and Performance Standards Under the 1976 Med-
ical Device Amendments, 40 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 421, 422 (1985); see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1994).
35. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
36. Id.
37. Adler, supra note 19, at 512.
38. Id. at 512-13. Once a performance standard has been established for a type of
medical device, any such device that fails to meet that standard will be blocked from enter-
ing the marketplace. Id.
39. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
40. Id.
41. Adler, supra note 19, at 513.
42. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
43. Benson et al., supra note 8, at 497.
44. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii).
45. Adler, supra note 19, at 513.
46. Mesner, supra note 10, at 270.
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the MDA of 1976.47 Additionally, the SDMA more clearly defines the
"substantial compliance" needed before a device is permitted to enter the
market through mere notification rather than through a more extensive
approval process, 48 and it incorporates "design validation" as an addi-
tional "good manufacturing practice" concept.
49
The MDA of 1992 made revisions primarily in sections 360i and 3601 of
the original MDA, and include several changes concerning the record and
reports of medical devices. 50 For example, in regard to user reports, a
device user facility must notify the FDA whenever it "receives or other-
wise becomes aware of information that reasonably suggests that a device
has or may have caused or contributed to the serious illness of, or serious
injury to, a patient of the facility."'51 The 1992 amendment also added a
provision requiring a device user facility to report to the FDA whenever
it "receives or otherwise becomes aware of... other significant adverse
device experiences as determined by the Secretary [of the FDA] by regu-
lation to be necessary to be reported.152
In regard to post-market surveillance, the MDA of 1992 added a provi-
sion requiring that each manufacturer ordered to conduct a surveillance
of a device at the discretion of the FDA shall, within thirty days after
receiving such notice, submit for approval a protocol for the required
surveillance. 53
C. THE MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATORY PROCESS
The FDA's primary purpose is to exercise enough regulatory control
over new products to prevent dangerous products from entering the mar-
ket without simultaneously hindering technological innovation.54 As a
result, the FDA recognizes only two paths that a medical device can fol-
low in order to meet FDA approval and enter the market: pre-market
notification and pre-market application approval. 55 The purpose behind
pre-market notification is to decrease the amount of time between the
submission and eventual consumer use of a device.5 6 Thus, the FDA al-
lows pre-market notification to suffice in order for a "new" device to be
marketed if it is characterized by a "substantial equivalence" to a similar
device that was approved before 1976.57 The term "substantial equiva-
47. Id.; see Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 5(a)(2), 104 Stat.
4511, 4517 (1990) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B)).
48. See infra part II.C.
49. Mesner, supra note 10, at 270-71; see Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, supra note
47, § 18 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(f)(1)(A) (1994)).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 360i (1994).
51. Id § 360i(b)(1) (B)(i) (emphasis added).
52. Id. § 360i(b)(1)(B)(ii).
53. Id § 3601(b).
54. Benson et al., supra note 8, at 499.
55. Id
56. See id. at 499-500.




lence" involves some amount of ambiguity. David Kessler, the present
head of the FDA, has stated that Congress apparently intended for the
term to apply to products that have undergone changes that do not affect
their safety and effectiveness.58 The consequence of allowing a manufac-
turer to use pre-market notification is that the manufacturer's new "look
alike" product will not be more highly regulated than a near-identical
device that was manufactured before 1976.59 Under this process, a manu-
facturer of a substantially equivalent device must notify the FDA of its
desire to market the device. 60 The FDA is to deny or approve the peti-
tion within ninety days from the date the Secretary receives the recom-
mendation of a panel as to the petition, but not later than 210 days after
the manufacturer has filed the petition.61 The pre-market notification
concept is also referred to as "substantial equivalence. '62
The second process by which a device can be approved is pre-market
approval. As compared to pre-market notification, it offers more protec-
tion to consumers since it involves more extensive regulation. As a re-
sult, it requires more time, effort and money on the part of the
manufacturer in order for the product to meet FDA standards. Pre-mar-
ket approval requires that new medical products without analogous pred-
ecessors be permitted to enter the market only after their clinical safety
and effectiveness have been proved.63 Safety and effectiveness are evalu-
ated in a specific manner:
The safety and effectiveness of a device are to be determined with
respect to the persons for whose use the device is represented or
intended, with respect to the conditions of use prescribed, recom-
mended, or suggested in the labeling of the device, and weighing any
probable benefit to health from the use of the device against any
probable risk of injury or illness from such use. 64
The ratio of probable health benefits against probable risks of harm
must be satisfactory, but evidence that the device will never cause injury
or will be effective in every situation is not required.65 Under the pre-
market approval requirements, a manufacturer must submit a detailed
application to the FDA, including information pertaining to product spec-
ifications, intended use, manufacturing methods, and proposed labeling.66
The FDA refers each application to a panel of qualified experts that
prepares a report and recommendation. 67 The FDA has six months to
either accept or reject the application.68 However, even though the law
58. Kessler et al., supra note 4, at 359-60.
59. Id. at 359; 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(2)(B).
60. Kessler, et al., supra note 4, at 359; 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(2)(A).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(2)(C).
62. See Adler, supra note 19, at 513.
63. Benson et al., supra note 8, at 500.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2).
65. S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1070, 1084.
66. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1) (1994).
67. Id. § 360e(c)(2).
68. Id. § 360e(d)(1)(A).
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sets the deadline at 180 days, the FDA generally takes approximately one
year to approve the application.69 In particular, poorly prepared applica-
tions can lead to delays in the application approval process.70 If the de-
vice passes the pre-market approval process, the manufacturer is required
to file a supplement to its application before making any alterations af-
fecting the safety and effectiveness of the device. 71 In addition, the man-
ufacturer has a never-ending duty to discern whether the product, as well
as its labeling, continue to be both safe and effective for consumer use.72
D. EXPERIMENTAL MEDICAL DEVICES UNDER THE MEDICAL
DEVICES AMENDMENTS
In certain instances, manufacturers can evade going through either pre-
market notification or pre-market approval and still make their medical
devices available to the public. The MDA contain provisions for experi-
mental or investigational medical devices. Investigational devices are ex-
empted from some of the more stringent requirements related to safety
and effectiveness mandated by the MDA.73 The objective behind this ex-
emption is "to encourage, to the extent consistent with the protection of
the public health and safety and with ethical standards, the discovery and
development of useful devices intended for human use and to that end to
maintain optimum freedom for scientific investigators in their pursuit of
that purpose. ''74 Thus, the investigational device exemption helps foster
innovation consistent with the public's health and safety. The 1976 Sen-
ate Report relating to investigational medical devices stated:
The Committee recognizes the necessity to encourage scientific in-
vestigation in the medical devices field and has attempted to provide
optimum freedom for individual scientific investigators in their pur-
suit of that objective. The Committee has therefore provided an ex-
emption to qualified scientific investigators from the requirements of
this Section during the time of the investigational use of devices in
order that they may collect sufficient data to establish that the device
should be on the market.75
Consequently, an investigational medical device is not required to un-
dergo the stringent pre-market approval process generally applicable to
medical devices. However, an investigational device does have to meet
certain requirements before it is permitted to enter the market. Manufac-
turers must submit an application to the FDA describing the device and
pronouncing a plan for examining the device's use on human subjects.76
69. Kessler et al., supra note 4, at 359 (citing CENTER FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOOI-
CAL HEALTH, FDA, PMA CRITICISMS TASK FORCE REPORT 1985).
70. Id.
71. 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 (1994).
72. Id.
73. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g).
74. Id. § 360j(g)(1).
75. S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1070, 1085.
76. 21 C.F.R. §§ 812.20-.38 (1995).
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The FDA can, of course, either accept or reject the application. Further-
more, once a product obtains FDA approval, the FDA continues to moni-
tor the device's clinical investigation in order to ensure that its presence
in the market was well founded. 77
III. PREEMPTION
A. OVERVIEW
As previously discussed, the FDA maintains strong control over the
introduction of new medical devices into the market. In particular, the
pre-market approval process provides for the regulatory control of medi-
cal devices so that a device's safety and effectiveness can be reasonably
assured before it enters the market. Furthermore, the post-approval reg-
ulation ensures that the FDA continues to receive information relating to
devices after they become available to the public. Manufacturers of de-
vices rely upon such controls to immunize them from tort liability law-
suits. In fact, as previously mentioned, several recent cases have granted
manufacturers of Class III medical devices immunity from essentially all
product liability claims based on alleged defects in the design or labeling
of the devices. 78
The courts in both King and Stamps held that the plaintiff's product
liability claims were based on state law requirements that were "different
from" or "in addition to" those requirements promulgated by the FDA.
Allowing the claims would require the manufacturer to redesign the
product, remove it from the market, or be subject to strict liability. The
courts held that such consequences were not permitted due to the exist-
ence of the MDA. The rationale for these two circuit court decisions was
based on preemption, which will now be addressed.
B. PREEMPTION GENERALLY
Preemption is defined as a "[d]octrine adopted by [the] U.S. Supreme
Court holding that certain matters are of such a national, as opposed to
local, character that federal laws preempt or take precedence over state
laws. As such, a state may not pass a law inconsistent with the federal
law."' 79 Put another way, one author defines preemption as "the author-
ity granted to the Congress by the U.S. Constitution to assume partial or
total responsibility for a governmental function, thereby delimiting the
77. See, e.g., id. § 813.66(a)(5).
78. King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993);
Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993). In
fact, "King is the first federal appellate court decision holding that the FDA's regulations
are so encompassing as to automatically preempt any state common law claim brought due
to an injury caused by a Class III medical device." Angela W. Kronenberg, Note, King v.
Collagen Corporation: FDA Approval Insulates Medical Device Manufacturers from State
Common Law Liability, 11 J. Cor'rEmp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 563, 569 (1995) (citing Panel
Bars Product Liability Suit, Bus. INs., Jan. 25, 1993, at 70).
79. BLACK'S LAW DiCrIONARY 1177 (6th ed. 1990); see also Painter's Local Union No.
567 v. Tom Joyce Floors, Inc., 398 P.2d 245, 246 (Nev. 1965).
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roles of the states and their political subdivisions. '80 Federal preemption
is rooted in the United States Constitution, specifically the Supremacy
Clause. This clause establishes the framework for the balance of powers
between the federal government and the state governments. The
Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Law of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.81
Thus, the preemption doctrine is based on the language of the Constitu-
tion which states that the laws of the federal government are "the
supreme law of the land," so that federal laws are given priority over
state or local law.82 The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose for
the enactment of the Supremacy Clause was to "avoid the introduction of
disparities, confusions, and conflicts which would follow if the Govern-
ment's general authority were subject to local controls. 83 In short, pre-
emption requires that federal law take priority over state and local law.
The underlying rationale of the Supremacy Clause is that a unified na-
tional government is contingent upon supreme federal power.84 In other
words, "[b]ecause Congress alone of the three federal branches repre-
sents the states as states, the Framers gave it the authority to balance, by
choosing whether to preempt state laws with federal legislation, the com-
peting interests of federal power and states' rights. 85 The tension be-
tween federalism and congressional supremacy becomes visible when
analyzing the conflicting interests of Congress and the states in regards to
health and safety legislation.86
On one side are the state's police powers, signifying state supremacy,
that embody the state's goal of protecting the safety and health of its
citizens.87 Early in this century, the Supreme Court held that "the police
power of a State embraces regulations designed to promote the public
convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to
promote the public health, the public morals or the public safety." s88 On
the other side is Congress' interest in protecting public health and safety,
80, JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: THE SILENT REVOLUTION 3
(1991).
81. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
82. Michael R. Taylor, Federal Preemption and Food and Drug Regulation: The Practi-
cal, Modern Meaning of an Ancient Doctrine, 38 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 306, 306 (1983).
83. United States v. Allegheny Co., 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944).
84. Susan B. Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federal-
ism, 70 VA. L. REv. 1429, 1432 (1984).
85. Id. at 1432-33 (footnotes omitted).
86. Id. at 1433.
87. Id.
88. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592
(1906); see also Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 428 (1963).
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especially where it considers state laws to be inadequate.8 9 This concern
led to the establishment of federal standards for medical devices.90 Of
course, the courts presume that Congress does not endeavor to supersede
police powers at the state level unless it is the "clear and manifest pur-
pose of Congress" to do so.91 In Hines v. Davidowitz,92 the Supreme
Court stated its complicated task in determining whether claims are pre-
empted. The Court said: "Our primary function is to determine whether,
under the circumstances of this particular case, [the state] law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. ' 93 The purposes and objectives of Congress to
which the Court refers are synonymous with those presently at issue in
this discussion, namely, public health and safety.
Both federal and state law encompass broad definitions. The general
view is that federal preemption will not be lightly imposed upon the
states. 94 Federal law encompasses not only the United States Constitu-
tion, treaties, and statutes, but also federal regulations as established by
federal agencies. 95 The Supreme Court discussed the preemptive power
of federal agencies in Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Federal
Communications Commission.96 In that case, the Court held that pre-
emption may result not only from congressional action, but also from fed-
eral agencies acting within the scope of their congressionally delegated
authority. 97 For purposes of the preemption doctrine, state law includes
not only state constitutions, statutes and regulations, but also state com-
mon-law tort actions.98
In order for the preemption doctrine to be applicable, certain elements
must be present. The primary factor in determining whether federal pre-
emption exists involves a determination by the court to discern Congres-
sional intent to preempt.99 In fact, the Supreme Court has declined to
find preemption when Congressional intent to supersede state law is not
"clear and manifest."'100
There are two ways in which a court may determine Congressional in-
tent. The more obvious of the two occurs when the wording in a regula-
89. Foote, supra note 84, at 1433.
90. See supra part II.A.
91. Taylor, supra note 82, at 311 (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977)); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947).
92. 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
93. Id; see also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141
(1963).
94. Pennington P. Landen, Federal Preemption and the Drug Industry: Can Courts Co-
Regulate?, 43 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 85, 87 (1988).
95. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
96. 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986).
97. Id.
98. Landen, supra note 94, at 86.
99. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
100. Id. (assuming historic police powers of the states are not superseded by federal
laws unless it is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress).
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tion expressly provides an intent to preempt state law.' 0 ' Thus, Congress
can preempt state law by specifically stating its intent to do so.102 The
second way occurs when a court finds an implied intention to preempt
based on any number of factors, such as the comprehensive nature of the
regulations, a dominant federal interest in the particular field, or a direct
conflict between state and federal law.10 3
C. PREEMPTION AS RELATING TO MEDICAL DEVICES
When Congress significantly expanded federal regulatory control of
medical devices by the MDA in 1976, it expressly preempted competing
state requirements. Thus, this paper focuses on express preemption
rather than implied preemption. The pertinent part of the MDA relating
to preemption is section 360k(a) which provides:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or con-
tinue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any
requirement -
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement ap-
plicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device
under this chapter.104
Some potential relief, however, is afforded to the states. The statute per-
mits states to petition for an exemption in certain circumstances. 05 The
exemption requirements are set forth in section 360k(b):
Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the
Secretary may, by regulation promulgated after notice and opportu-
nity for an oral hearing, exempt from subsection (a) of this section,
under such conditions as may be prescribed in such regulation, a re-
quirement of such State or political subdivision applicable to a de-
vice intended for human use if -
(1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under
this chapter which would be applicable to the device if an exemption
were not in effect under this subsection; or
(2) the requirement -
(A) is required by compelling local conditions, and
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause the device
to be in violation of any applicable requirement under this
chapter.'06
The exemption applies to both state and local statutes and regulations,'0 7
101. Jones, 430 U.S. at 525.
102. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983).
103. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (dis-
cussing the various types of implied preemption); see also Rice, 331 U.S. at 218 (discussing
the factors that give rise to implied Congressional occupation of a particular area).
104. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
105. Id. § 360k(b).
106. Id
107. 21 C.F.R. 808.1 (1995).
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and the FDA regulations provide specific examples of state and local
medical device provisions not preempted by the FDA for twenty-one
states.'08 For example, the FDA has decided that a Texas provision re-
garding the duty of persons engaged in the fitting and dispensing of hear-
ing instruments'0 9 is not preempted by the MDA.110
Congress left no question that its intent was for the MDA to have a
broad preemptive effect."' One reason offered for this broad language is
that interstate commerce must not be unduly burdened. 112 An additional
justification for the wide scope of the preemption provisions is that Con-
gress strongly suspected that potential state or local requirements per-
taining to medical devices, in addition to existing federal controls, would
cause an undue burden that could severely interfere with technological
innovations.113 Thus, the preemption of additional state requirements
was fundamental for Congress to achieve its objective of fostering re-
search and development, which is tied to its goal of protecting the health
and safety of the people. This desire not to restrain growth in the medical
device industry relates back to Congress' intent to protect the public from
dangerous and ineffective devices with the minimum amount of control
by the federal branch of government.
The applicability of preemption is also grounded in the FDA regula-
tions. Section 808.1(b) states:
[The MDA] prescribes a general rule that ... no State or political
subdivision ... may establish or continue in effect any requirement
with respect to a medical device intended for human use having the
force and effect of law (whether established by statute, ordinance,
regulation, or court decision), which is different from, or in addition
to, any requirement applicable to such device under any provision of
the act and which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device
or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the
device under the act." 4
Thus, when determining whether preemption is applicable, three ele-
ments must be present. First, the state must "establish or continue in
effect with respect to a device intended for human use any require-
ment. '' "15 Next, the requirement must be "different from, or in addition
to, any requirement applicable" to a device under the MDA. 116 Finally,
the state requirement must pertain "to the safety or effectiveness of the
device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the
108. Id. § 808.53-.98.
109. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4566, § 1.14(b) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
110. 21 C.F.R. 808.93 (1994).
111. Lars Noah, Amplification of Federal Preemption in Medical Device Cases, 49 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 183, 185 (1994).
112. Id (citing Massachusetts v. Hayes, 691 F.2d 57, 60-61 (1st Cir. 1982)). The intent
of the MDA's express preemption provision was "to prevent an undue burden on interstate
commerce through the proliferation of varying state requirements." Id.
113. Noah, supra note 111, at 185.
114. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1994).




device" under the MDA.117
IV. ANALYSIS OF PREEMPTION IN LIGHT OF CASE LAW
A. OVERVIEW
It is up to the courts to determine how the preemption doctrine should
be interpreted. In suits involving FDA products, the courts must balance
the interests of the federal and state governments, keeping in mind the
profound effects that their decisions can have on manufacturers and con-
sumers. Furthermore, it is the role of the courts to attempt to determine
congressional intent.
One area of tension concerning the FDA regulations is that some view
the standards set forth by the FDA to be minimum standards, while
others argue that the FDA's regulation of the medical device industry is
so comprehensive as to justify preemption of state law.118 These compet-
ing views form the backbone of many cases involving medical devices and
must be analyzed completely to determine whether the Framers of the
Constitution actually intended for a regulatory agency, such as the FDA,
to completely preempt state law claims in a particular area such as medi-
cal devices.
As previously discussed, the MDA expressly prohibit states and locali-
ties from imposing on manufacturers requirements that differ from or are
in addition to those promulgated by federal law. 119 However, ambiguity
exists as to whether the federal statutes applicable to product safety
should be construed to preempt state tort-law damage claims against
manufacturers whose devices meet the federal standards.1 20 One author
has stated that "[diespite the numerous product preemption cases de-
cided over the past five years, federal courts remain hopelessly divided on
this issue.' 21 Generally, however, the courts have opined that section
360k prohibits state damage claims against manufacturers of medical de-
vices. Nevertheless, just last year, the Ninth Circuit departed from this
trend. 22
The cases that focus on the MDA's preemptive effect show that, if the
FDA regulates and approves a certain aspect of a device, such as labeling,
design, or manufacture, "tort claims based on the inadequacy of that as-
pect of the device are preempted when the claims would pose a require-
ment that is different from, or in addition to, any requirement imposed on
117. Id.
118. Marilyn P. Westerlield, Comment, Federal Preemption and the FDA: What Does
Congress Want?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 263, 264 (1989).
119. See supra text accompanying note 104.
120. Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44
S.C. L. REV. 187, 190 (1993).
121. Id.
122. See Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
the "MDA does not preempt claims based on state common law of general applicability,
including tort law damages claims").
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the device under the MDA."' 23 The next step is to examine the argu-
ments favoring and opposing preemption in light of case law on the
subject.
Litigation arising out of federal preemption issues specifically pertain-
ing to the MDA and Class III medical devices has been inextensive. 124 In
fact, only a small number of cases addressing this specific subject have
reached the federal court of appeals level. King, Stamps, and Slater v.
Optical Radiation Corp. 125 are three of the earliest such cases to have
reached the circuit courts. These three opinions are consistent in their
rationale and their outcomes. 126
The general fact pattern of King and Stamps has been previously laid
out.127 In the earlier of the two scenarios, Jane King sought Zyderm
treatment in 1987. Zyderm is a cosmetic medical device, consisting of the
injection of processed cow tissue, that is used to correct wrinkles and
other skin deformities. Following the ordinary guidelines, Ms. King's
physician administered a small dose of Zyderm before going forward with
the entire treatment. A short time after the administration of the test
dose, Ms. King complained of muscle and joint pains, in addition to other
symptoms. She was then diagnosed with DM/PM, an autoimmune dis-
ease in which the immune system attacks skin and muscle tissue as if it
were a foreign substance.
Approximately one year after Ms. King was injected with Zyderm, Jen-
nifer Stamps, in March and April of 1988, was injected with two devices:
Zyderm and Zyplast. Zyplast is a similar product to Zyderm; both con-
tain processed bovine collagen and are intended for use as an anti-wrin-
kle treatment. Like Ms. King, Ms. Stamps began suffering from muscle
and joint pains shortly after receiving the treatment and was subsequently
diagnosed with DMIPM.
Slater involves an action based on another Class III medical device,
intraocular lenses. However, the device in Slater is unique among ordi-
nary Class III devices in that it is an investigational device. The signifi-
cance of a device being classified as investigational is set forth in a
subsequent section.128 In light of these three cases in particular, I will
now address arguments in favor of and in opposition to preemption of
claims relating to medical devices.
123. Brian J. Donato & Mary Beth Neraas, Federal Preemption of Product Liability
Claims Involving Drugs and Medical Devices Regulated Under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 305, 312 (1993).
124. Cynthia B. Stewart, Case Note, Medical Device Litigation: Federal Preemption of
State Tort Claims: King v. Collagen Corp., 2 J. PHARMACY & L. 357, 365-66 (1994) (citing
Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1423 n.7).
125. 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 327 (1992).
126. Stewart, supra note 124, at 366.
127. See discussion supra Part I.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 143-55.
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B. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF PREEMPTION OF CLAIMS RELATING TO
MEDICAL DEVICES
1. Federal Objectives Cannot Be Undermined
Allowing claims based on state law as relating to a defect in a medical
device could undermine the federal regulatory scheme and pose a threat
to the accomplishment of federal objectives. The argument is that "[iln
view of the comprehensiveness and rigor of the federal scheme, courts
should defer to the specific scientific and policy judgments made by the
FDA. ' 129 If courts do not defer to the FDA, the result is that both the
states and the courts have no alternative but to second-guess the FDA.130
In the Stamps case,' 31 the court discussed the fact that the pre-market
approval process allows the FDA to evaluate "whether a proposed prod-
uct provides 'reasonable assurance of its safety and effectiveness.""132
Thus, the focus of the federal objective is to allow products that have
been determined to be safe and effective to enter the marketplace and be
used by consumers. Zyderm, the collagen product used by Ms. Stamps,
had met the stringent FDA standards, so that the FDA considered the
product to be safe and effective for consumer use. The court, therefore,
dismissed the plaintiff's claims based on defective design, inadequate
warnings, and failure to warn, because these claims were preempted by
federal law. If the court had permitted such actions, the federal scheme
would have indeed been undermined, and the credibility of the FDA
would certainly have been questioned.
The opinion in King likewise addressed the federal government's desire
to protect the public at the federal level.133 Judge Aldrich, in his concur-
ring opinion, wrote, "[s]urely, where the FDA was authorized to render
the expert decision on Collagen's use and labeling, it, and not some jury
or judge, is best suited to determine the factual issues and what their ef-
fect would have been on its original conclusions.' 1 34 This argument thus
addresses the proposition that the FDA, through its extensive research
pertaining to medical devices and the rigid requirements that it imposes
on manufacturers, can best achieve what is considered to be a federal
objective rather than judges or juries at the state level.
2. Need for Development and Marketing of New Products
Permitting state claims against manufacturers who have complied with
FDA standards could certainly have a serious effect on their incentive to
129. Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal and State
Tort Law Drug Regulation, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 171, 193 (1986).
130. Laura K. Jortberg, Note, Who Should Bear the Burden of Experimental Medical
Device Testing: The Preemptive Scope of the Medical Device Amendments Under Slater v.
Optical Radiation Corp., 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 963, 984 (1994).
131. For a discussion of the facts in Stamps, see discussion supra part IV.A.
132. Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1419 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)).
133. For a discussion of the facts in King, see discussion supra part IV.A.
134. King, 983 F.2d at 1140.
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develop and market new products. 135 If manufacturers are confident as
to a device's safety and effectiveness after it passes the FDA pre-market
approval requirements, but nevertheless are not immune to state claims,
they will be reluctant to introduce new devices.
In Stamps, the court determined that the manufacturer of the collagen
products had followed the proper pre-market approval requirements. 136
In other words, Collagen Corporation had submitted a detailed applica-
tion to the FDA, including information pertaining to product specifica-
tions, intended use, manufacturing methods, and proposed labeling, and
the FDA had approved the application. Collagen Corporation thus had
every reason to believe that its product was ready for consumer use in a
safe and effective manner. If the manufacturer had felt that it was never-
theless susceptible to state tort liability, it very well may have decided
that the expected profits of introducing the device would not exceed po-
tential liability damages and that it would not be in the corporation's best
interest to market the product.
In King, the court identified health protection as a federal objective. 137
Both parties agreed with this contention; they disagreed, however, as to
what exactly such an objective encompasses. King argued that the MDA
are aimed at the consumer by prohibiting harmful products from entering
the market and assuring that labels contain adequate warnings. 138 On the
other hand, Collagen Corporation stated that the statute's purpose also
includes benefiting the consumer public by protecting regulated manufac-
turers from inconsistent state regulation, including lawsuits. 139
The concurring opinion in King expands the defendant's reasoning by
declaring that, if legal risks are too high, potentially beneficial medical
devices "may be left in the laboratory, to the public's loss. '140 The con-
currence noted that one of the primary objectives of the MDA was to
encourage the research and development of new products and to facili-
tate the marketing of new and improved devices without delay.' 41 Thus,
the focus of this argument was on the benefits to the public due to im-
proved technology and new scientific evidence. As a result, the concur-
ring judges' cost-benefit analysis led to their declaration that
"[p]erfection is impossible and a few individuals may be denied full pro-
tection at the cost of benefiting the rest."'1 42
In Slater, the plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer of
intraocular lenses, seeking recovery under state law in negligence, strict
liability, and breach of implied warranty for injury to his eye allegedly
135. See Landen, supra note 94, at 118 (noting that "[t]he spectre of liability-despite
FDA approval-chills the manufacturer's incentive to develop new products").
136. Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1419.
137. King, 983 F.2d at 1138 (concurring opinion).
138. 1a& at 1137.
139. 1d. at 1137-38.
140. Id. at 1138.
141. Id.
142. King, 983 F.2d at 1138 (concurring opinion).
1996]
SMU LAW REVIEW
caused by lens implantation and removal. Intraocular lenses are specifi-
cally classified as Class III medical devices. 143 However, the regulatory
controls for intraocular lenses diverge from other Class III devices due to
the Investigational Device Exemption Regulation,'" which "expressly
preempts state law claims based on safety or effectiveness of a particular
intraocular lens where that lens has been granted an investigational de-
vice exemption by the FDA.' 45 Specifically, federal regulations provide
that:
(a) An intraocular lens is . . . synonymous with "investigational
device" lens or lenses.
(b) "Investigational device" means a device that is used in an in-
vestigational study involving human subjects, where the study is for
the purpose of determining if the device is safe or effective. 146
Thus, like the collagen product in King and Stamps, the device at issue
in Slater was a Class III device. However, intraocular lenses differ from
the collagen products in that the lenses are experimental devices. The
Seventh Circuit determined that the plaintiffs state law claims failed as
they were specifically preempted by federal law. 147 More specifically, the
district court in Slater stated that "[t]he imposition of state tort require-
ments in this case would clearly be 'different from, or in addition to' both
the terms of the FDCA [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] and the require-
ments of the IDE [Investigational Device Exemption] regulations
promulgated by the FDA for safety or effectiveness.' 148
It is significant in this case that Albert Slater decided for himself to
undergo an experimental procedure in which his natural lens was re-
placed with an intraocular lens implant. He chose to undergo this proce-
dure in an attempt to prevent potential total blindness. Prior to the
procedure, Mr. Slater signed a consent form, signifying that he was aware
that he was taking part in a clinical operation. Unfortunately, the dam-
age resulting to Mr. Slater's eye was greater than what he would have
suffered had he chosen not to undergo the procedure.
To be able to use an experimental device under FDA control, an indi-
vidual must consent to using the device in its investigational stage.149
Thus, it is an individual's decision to participate in a clinical investigation
program involving an experimental medical device. The individual is
made aware of the possibility of injury. The Slater court stated that plain-
tiffs have no cause of action against a manufacturer of an experimental
device arising out of the safety and effectiveness of the device, so that
143. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 756 F. Supp. 370, 373 n.6 (N.D.Ill. 1991), affd,
961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 327 (1992).
144. See 21 C.F.R. § 813 (1995).
145. Slater, 756 F. Supp. at 373 (emphasis added).
146. 21 C.F.R. § 813.3(a),(b) (1995).
147. Slater, 961 F.2d at 1333.
148. Slater, 756 F. Supp. at 373.
149. 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (1995).
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state tort remedies are not available to them.150 Furthermore, the court
continued to state that no federal damages remedy exists, either. 15'
The reasoning behind the Slater decision lies in the argument that "[i]t
seems fair that if all necessary FDA regulations are met, manufacturers
should not be held liable for claims covered by the FDA regulations.' '1 52
This element of certainty is essential for the advancement of new and
beneficial medical devices.' 53 If manufacturers are not insulated from
state law claims, they might determine, at the public's expense, that it is
not effective from a cost-benefit standpoint to market new devices. 154
Thus, fear of tort liability may have the severe effect of causing manufac-
turers to remove existing products from the market.155 The public is then
deprived of products which are FDA-approved, but which are not avail-
able because the manufacturers of such products are reluctant to open
the door to the slight chance that litigation involving the device might
arise.
3. Federal Standards Are Not Mere Minimum Standards
Advocates favoring preemption often argue that FDA standards should
not be considered minimum standards that need to be complemented by
state laws. FDA standards are the result of extensive research and test-
ing. Thus, the argument continues, courts should not allow juries to un-
dermine the FDA's judgment as to scientific evidence, 56 since "[h]olding
a manufacturer liable after it has complied with FDA standards effec-
tively second-guesses the FDA's judgment."' 57 Since the FDA is consid-
ered the expert on medical devices, the states and courts should defer to
the FDA's insight on this subject. 158
In Stamps, the court held that all three of the plaintiff's causes of action
were preempted by the MDA.159 Stamps's first two causes of action were
based on inadequate labeling and failure to warn. The court stated:
The Class III regulatory structure... involves the FDA in considera-
ble oversight regarding proposed package labeling of a device. Nor
can Stamps's third cause of action. . ., based upon the defective de-
sign and manufacture of Collagen's products, survive preemption, as
the Class III PMA [pre-market approval] process includes FDA scru-
150. Slater, 961 F.2d at 1333-34.
151. Id.
152. Stewart, supra note 124, at 368.
153. Id. at 368-69.
154. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES 4 (1988). American manufacturers spend over $80 billion annually in tort liabil-
ity and insurance costs, the effect being that new and possibly safer products are prevented
from being marketed. Id.
155. Landen, supra note 94, at 119.
156. Id at 112.
157. Jortberg, supra note 130, at 985.
158. Id.; see also Premo Pharmaceutical Labs., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 795, 804
(2d Cir. 1980) (offering the opinion that the FDA, because of its expertise, is generally in a
stronger position to make decisions regarding medical devices than the courts).
159. 984 F.2d at 1425.
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tiny and approval of these particular aspects of a device. 160
The court continued by addressing Stamps's argument that "the MDA
forms only the floor of regulation; the states are free to construct a regu-
latory ceiling.' 61 The court agreed with Stamps that, under the Class III
regulatory structure, Collagen Corporation could have strengthened its
warning labels without first gaining permission from the FDA.162 In fact,
the FDA's "Conditions of Approval" that it set out with respect to
Zyderm provide that:
Changes in labeling, manufacturing, sterilization, packaging, or per-
formance of design specification which enhance safety of the device
or safety in the use of the device may be placed into effect by the
sponsor prior to the receipt of a written FDA approval of the supple-
mental PMA [pre-market approval]. . . . Specific examples of
changes permitted are: (1) addition of warnings, contraindications, or
side effects .... 163
The court disagreed with the plaintiff's conclusion from the above lan-
guage in the "Conditions of Approval" that the absence of a direct con-
flict between the federal and state provisions mandated a finding of no
preemption. Instead, the court drew the opposite conclusion and reiter-
ated the presence of the language in the MDA expressly preempting "any
requirement" as applicable to medical devices. 164
Likewise, in King, the court examined the argument that the FDA re-
quirements are merely the minimum, rather than the maximum, protec-
tion made available to the consumer. The court examined the MDA's
provisions detailing what an application for pre-market approval should
contain.' 65 In particular, the court looked at the requirement that "speci-
mens of the labeling proposed to be used for such device" be contained in
an application for a medical device. 166 The concurring judges noted that
the MDA as a whole provide "maximum protection and express preemp-
tion, leaving no need to seek implications.' 67 Thus, the six claims made
by the plaintiff in King relating to a failure to warn were preempted,
given the 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(F) requirement that the FDA must re-
view the proposed labels for the product.
4. Need for Uniformity
There are dominant and superseding federal interests in establishing
uniformity in the design and manufacture of medical products. This need
for uniformity was addressed by the United States District Court for the
160. Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1422 (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 1424.
162. Id.
163. Id. The FDA regulations allow, without prior FDA approval, "[l]abeling changes
that add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution or information about an
adverse reaction." 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(d)(2)(i) (1995).
164. Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1424-45 (emphasis added).
165. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1) (1994).
166. Id. § 360e(c)(1)(F).
167. King, 983 F.2d at 1139.
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Eastern District of Texas in Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories.168 The Fifth
Circuit ultimately reversed the decision; however, the policy reasons for
uniformity are illustrated nevertheless. Manufacturers in all states should
be forced to adhere to the same standards when marketing a new medical
device. In addition, manufacturers in all states should be bound by the
same laws; it seems unjust for manufacturers of similar products to be
held to conflicting state tort laws and regulations.
C. ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO PREEMPTION OF CLAIMS
RELATING TO MEDICAL DEVICES
1. Congress' Intent Is Not Completely Clear
Opponents of the theory that preemption bars state tort-law claims
pertaining to medical devices point out that the legislative history of the
MDA does not state whether Congress intended to preempt such
claims. 169 Opponents advocate that "[t]his legislative silence is strong ev-
idence that Congress did not intend section 360k(a) to preempt state tort
law.' 170 Nevertheless, proponents of preemption point to section 360k(a)
of the MDA, which expressly provides for the preemption of state re-
quirements. Proponents of preemption stress that "the FDA has specifi-
cally interpreted this section to preempt state tort law as well as
legislative and administrative regulations." 171 Furthermore, although one
might argue that section 360k(a) does not provide the FDA with the
power to preempt state tort law, the Supreme Court's holding in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.172 mandates that
courts defer to an agency's interpretation if the interpretation is based on
a permissible construction of the statute in question. 73 Therefore, the
argument continues, "[b]ecause the FDA's interpretation of section
360k(a) is apparently permissible, the courts should defer to the FDA's
judgment and rule that tort claims against manufacturers who comply
with the requirements of the MDA are preempted.' 74
2. Promotion of Public Safety
Certainly a much stronger, if not the strongest, argument in opposition
to preemption is that holding manufacturers liable for state tort claims
will encourage them to develop products that are safer for consumer
168. 651 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd, 851 F.2d 1536 (5th Cir. 1988).
169. Ausness, supra note 120, at 282.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 283; see 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1994).
172. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
173. Id. at 842-45.
174. Ausness, supra note 120, at 283; see Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243,
247 (5th Cir. 1989); Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1058, 1062-63 (D. Minn.
1989); Meyer v. International Playtex, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 288, 292-93 (D.N.J. 1988); Rine-
hart v. International Playtex, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475, 477 (S.D. Ind. 1988); Stewart v. Inter-
national Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907, 909-10 (D.S.C. 1987).
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use.' 75 Opponents of preemption argue that "[t]he federal government's
interest in the protection of the public would be badly served by preempt-
ing the state's power to protect its citizens."'1 76 If the manufacturer
knows that preemption will protect him as long as he meets FDA stan-
dards, he may very well stop there. On the other hand, if faced with the
risk of potential liability claims, the manufacturer may be more inclined
to maximize safety and effectiveness to an even higher degree. Further-
more, such a risk imposed on the manufacturer would most likely induce
that manufacturer to continue trying to improve the product after it has
entered the marketplace. But manufacturers not faced with such a risk
would feel protected against tort claims and could find it more cost-effec-
tive to stop trying to improve the product. The manufacturer relying on
preemption may attempt to continue maximizing a product's safety after
its entry into the market only if it would be profitable for him to do so.177
The argument that liability provides an incentive for manufacturers to
produce safer products can be applied to the King and Stamps cases. Op-
ponents of the preemption doctrine would argue that fear of tort liability
may have caused Collagen Corporation to have used more caution before
marketing Zyderm. Obviously, the product was far from completely safe
for consumer use. Perhaps more research and testing would have led to
the conclusion that the product was indeed capable of causing the
autoimmune disease.
Furthermore, Collagen Corporation, if faced with liability arising out of
state law claims, may have withdrawn the product once King, the earlier
of the two cases, surfaced. It is unfortunate that Collagen Corporation
was not threatened more seriously by King's claim; if it had been, the
similar scenario in Stamps may have been avoided.
As discussed previously, advocates favoring preemption stress that pre-
emption is essential to the development and marketing of new prod-
ucts. 178 However, the converse of this argument is not necessarily true.
By not preempting state tort claims, the development and marketing of
new products would not be hindered. In fact, a lack of preemption and
the introduction of new products could coexist. The FDA provides pro-
tection to manufacturers who pioneer devices that pose a certain amount
of risk due to the need for more testing by classifying such devices as
experimental or investigatory devices.' 79 Such devices fall outside of the
general category of medical devices because they are presented to con-
sumers as experimental, and a consumer must provide explicit consent
175. Jortberg, supra note 130, at 982; see Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483,
1493 (D. Kan. 1987) (state tort action viewed as actually enhancing the national goal of
optimum vaccine safety); MacGillivray v. Lederle Labs., 667 F. Supp. 743, 745 (D.N.M.
1987) (in rejecting a drug manufacturer's preemption defense, the court reasoned that the
objective of the FDA regulations is to promote distribution of safe and effective pharma-
ceutical products to the public).
176. Westerfield, supra note 118, at 283.
177. See Jortberg, supra note 130, at 982.
178. See discussion infra part IV.B.2.
179. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j.
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that he understands the risk involved with such a product before it may
be used. 180 An example of a plaintiff's claim being preempted because of
a device's experimental status is illustrated in Slater. In Slater, the device,
an intraocular lens, was an experimental product, and Mr. Slater signed a
consent form indicating that he understood the device to be in the experi-
mental stages and that its safety and effectiveness were not thoroughly
proven.
Devices labeled as experimental can be used by consumers only with
their consent and understanding of the limitations of the product; thus,
the risk of using such a product falls on the consumer rather than on the
manufacturer. If courts were to decide that preemption is not applicable
to state law claims based on defective medical devices, manufacturers
would still be inclined to introduce new devices to the public since they
could offer the devices as experimental until they gain assurance that the
devices are indeed safe and effective. In this way, manufacturers would
not be inclined to deprive the public of new technologies just so that they
could protect themselves from tort liability.
3. Spreading the Loss
An additional argument that state tort claims should not be preempted
involves spreading the loss caused by defective products. This argument
stresses that "[i]mposing liability on manufacturers also allows the risks
of products to be shifted from the injured plaintiff to everyone who bene-
fits from the product.'' The argument may stem from the rationale for
strict product liability that loss-spreading internalizes accident expenses
by assimilating them into the price of the product, so that potential liabil-
ity is spread among all who consume the product.182
Thus, loss-spreading permits an injured consumer to divert the ex-
penses incurred as a result of the injury onto the entire consuming pub-
lic. 183 This is "justified in part by the fact that future consumers benefit
from information gathered during the period prior to their own use of the
product."'l This justification is easily understood in situations involving
experimental medical devices, such as in Slater. While a product is in its
initial experimental stage, consumers can be compared to "guinea
pigs.' 8 5 Assuming that the product eventually passes the pre-market ap-
proval process, consumers in the future will enjoy a product that has
passed the experimental stage and will thus benefit from the knowledge
gained from use of the product during its experimental period. 186 The
180. See id. § 360(g)(3)(D); 21 C.F.R. § 812.1.
181. Jortberg, supra note 130, at 999.
182. William C. Powers, Jr., Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict Lia-
bility, 62 N.C. L. REV. 415, 423-28 (1984).
183. Jortberg, supra note 130, at 983.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 999; see also George C. Pratt & Fred W. Parnon, Diagnosis of a Legal Head-
ache: Liability for Unforeseeable Defects in Drugs, 53 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 517, 538 (1979).
186. Jortberg, supra note 130, at 999.
1996]
SMU LAW REVIEW
argument is that it is only fair to pass compensation costs onto future
consumers. 187 Finally, holding the manufacturer liable for state tort
claims is a process by which this cost can be passed to the consumer pub-
lic, since the cost of injuries can be figured into the price of the
product.188
4. Injured Plaintiffs Need a Remedy
A final argument is that preemption of state law claims involving defec-
tive medical devices leaves injured plaintiffs without a remedy. 189 In Ab-
bot v. American Cyanamid Co.,19° the Fourth Circuit held that a strong
presumption exists against preempting remedies, such as tort recoveries,
when federal regulation does not provide an alternative remedy. 91 This
lack of recourse, however, did not prevent the courts in King and Stamps
from holding that the state tort claims were preempted.
In Stamps, the plaintiff urged the court to allow her state tort law
claims to stand since no federal remedy existed. 192 In other words,
Stamps argued that, if her claim was preempted by federal law, her claim
in state court would be dismissed. She would not have a valid claim in
federal court either because the manufacturer had complied with federal
laws regarding its medical device. 193 Stamps cited Silkwood v. Kerr-Mc-
Gee Corp.194 for the proposition that a strong presumption exists against
preemption of state law remedies when federal remedies are absent. 195
But the Stamps court held that this presumption "is more appropriately
addressed in the context of implied preemption.' 1 96 Thus, the presump-
tion discussed in Silkwood was not applicable in Stamps or in any other
case relating to a medical device, since the MDA expressly preempt state
law claims. The Stamps court's conclusion on this issue was that "where
Congress has expressly preempted state common law damages actions, as
in... the MDA, its failure to provide a federal remedy will not defeat its
intent to preempt state law.' 97 The court was merely interpreting Con-
gress' intent as to whether state law was preempted. Concluding that
state law was indeed meant to be preempted in this situation, the court
did not attempt to provide an answer, if it deemed one necessary, for
187. Id.
188. Pratt & Parnon, supra note 185, at 537-38.
189. The MDA does provide remedies for plaintiffs harmed by medical devices that the
FDA proves to be reasonably dangerous. 21 U.S.C. § 360h (1994). However, plaintiffs are
limited to recovering costs only for the device's repair, replacement, or refund price. Id.
Conspicuously absent from the text of the MDA is the mention of any remedies meant to
compensate plaintiffs for their injuries, such as pain and suffering, and additional medical
care. Kronenberg, supra note 78, at 584.
190. 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
191. Id. at 1112.
192. Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1425.
193. Id.
194. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).





plaintiffs who contend that they are left remediless when their state tort
claims are preempted by the MDA. The Slater court alluded that there
are remedies other than legal ones, although it did not provide any exam-
ples. 1 98 The court stated, "It would be a mistake to conclude that pre-
emption in these circumstances leaves the consuming public remediless,
at least if we have concern for economic substance rather than legal for-
mality and do not suppose that the only 'remedies' (preventives, protec-
tions, correctives) are those that the law provides."'199
One criticism of preemption of state law claims relating to medical de-
vices is that injured plaintiffs have no remedy available to them since they
are denied recourse in state courts and no federal remedy exists. To in-
jured plaintiffs such as the women in King and Stamps, this lack of any
remedy whatsoever. seems extremely unjust.
5. Flaws in the Medical Devices Amendments
Finally, opponents of preemption in medical devices cases point to
flaws in the MDA. The basis of this argument is that the preemption
doctrine should not be invoked in this line of cases because the MDA are
far from perfect in achieving the federal objective of public health and
safety. The MDA have been criticized for serious shortcomings. One
commentator stated that, "[d]ue to the overwhelming complexity of the
classification scheme, as well as inertia on the part of the FDA, the MDA
of 1976 never accomplished their intended goal."'200 In 1982 and 1983,
congressional oversight hearings plainly showed that the FDA had not
been successful in executing congressional intent. 201 One problem was
that performance standards for medical devices in Class II had not yet
been put into force.202 In addition, too many products were entering the
market having merely gone through the pre-market notification proce-
dure rather than the more thorough pre-market approval process.20 3 The
effect of these problems on consumers was that unsafe and defective
medical devices continued to be marketed. 204 In fact, forty-four percent
of the device recalls between the years of 1983 and 1988 were connected
to product design problems.20 5 Congress itself has tried to correct
problems with the MDA by imposing additional regulations. For in-
stance, since the MDA of 1976, Congress has passed the Safe Medical
198. Slater, 961 F.2d at 1333.
199. Id.
200. Mesner, supra note 10, at 270.
201. Id (citing STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION: THE




205. H.R. REP. No. 808, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6305, 6326 (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL DEVICE RECALLS: AN OVER-
VIEW AND ANALYSIS 1983-1988, GAO/PEMD-89-15BR, 23-24 (1989)).
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Devices Act of 1990 and amended the MDA in 1992.206
Flaws present in the pre-market approval process have especially been
subject to attack. Absent are procedures detailing how to determine
whether a device is merely a substantial equivalent of an existing device
or an altogether new device. The result is much debate over the kind and
amount of information required to identify a "substantial equivalence" to
a pre-1976 device.207 In addition, even if a device is deemed a substantial
equivalent, critics of the pre-market notification scheme question its ef-
fectiveness. However, others argue that, if this more simple type of ap-
proval is eliminated, many devices will unnecessarily have to undergo the
rigors of the entire pre-market approval mechanism. In fact, approxi-
mately fifty-five "substantially equivalent" pre-market notifications are
filed for every one pre-market approval application.208 The consequence
of such a disparity between these two figures is that the more devices that
are not classified as substantial equivalents, the more serious the delay
will be in such devices reaching the consumer.
The fact that flaws are present in the pre-market approval process for
medical devices constitutes one of the strongest attacks against preemp-
tion. It seems unjust for the courts to automatically dismiss state tort
claims when the system is far from perfect. Of course, the courts are
merely applying the FDA regulations. The focus of the attack, therefore,
should be on the FDA and its enactment of the express preemptive lan-
guage of the MDA. With a flawed system by which medical devices be-
come available to the public (the scenarios of King and Stamps are just
two instances where persons have been injured due to non-investigational
medical devices), express preemption seems unfair to the public.
Furthermore, the flaws in the pre-market approval process are not re-
stricted to only one type. Some flaws are due to negligent behavior. The
argument here is that the system as a whole is susceptible to occasional
breakdowns. Negligent acts of manufacturers, such as the misreading of
injury reports, although not intentional, have the potential to cause se-
vere harm to consumers. The FDA surely does not want to encourage, or
even to ignore, such behavior which can seriously undermine the federal
objective of public health and safety. Therefore, opponents of preemp-
tion could argue that preemption of claims based on manufacturers' neg-
ligence should not be express so that manufacturers will be more
accountable for their actions.
Unfortunately for the public, some flaws in the pre-market approval
process for medical devices can arise out of fraudulent behavior by the
manufacturer. In this instance, express preemption should not be permit-
206. MDA of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 439 (1976) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 360c-360k, 379, 379a and 42 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994)), have been susequently amended by
the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511, and the MDA of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-300, 106 Stat. 238.
207. Benson et al., supra note 8, at 500.
208. Kessler et al., supra note 4, at 359 (citing 1-985 FDA, OFFICE OF DEVICE EVALUA-
TION, CENTER FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH ANN. REP.).
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ted due to a standard based on intentional torts. Manufacturers that are
so profit-driven may be inclined to falsify or suppress relevant data, caus-
ing the FDA to grant market clearance for a medical device that is not
safe or effective for consumer use. It is this type of situation in which an
argument in favor of preemption seems inherently unjust. Thus, express
preemption should not be applicable across the board since it is possible
for the system to be manipulated or perverted.
D. PREEMPTION CANNOT BE EXTENDED FURTHER THAN THE
STATUTORY LAW JUSTIFIES
In Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,209 the plaintiff brought a products
liability suit against a tampon manufacturer. Although a Class II product
was involved, the court's reasoning in the case is similar to that of the
later Class III devices cases, notably King and Stamps. In Moore, the
court of appeals held that some of the plaintiff's claims were preempted,
while others were not. More specifically, the court held that the MDA
and underlying regulations declaring tampons to be a medical device and
outlining liability and warning requirements with respect to toxic shock
syndrome (TSS) preempted state law tort claims against the defendant
manufacturer for inadequate warning and labeling.210 The court deter-
mined, however, that the "plaintiff's state law claims based on design,
composition and construction of tampons were not preempted. '211
After reviewing the governing statutes and regulations, the Moore
court found no clear intent on the part of Congress or the FDA to pre-
empt the whole field of tort liability with the TSS labeling requirements.
The court was guided by the specifically limited preemptive effect of the
regulations, which state that "[s]tate or local requirements are preempted
only when the Food and Drug Administration has established specific
counterpart regulations or there are other specific requirements applica-
ble to a particular device under the act."'212 The court's holding, which
affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's holding, is as
follows:
The district court's opinion which dismissed plaintiff's state law
claims based on inadequate warning and labeling is affirmed. Since
we have concluded that plaintiff's state law claims based on design,
composition and construction of tampons were not preempted by
federal law to the extent that such claims do not wholly or partially
depend on inadequate or improper warning or labeling, the opinion
of the district court which dismissed these claims is hereby reversed
213
The King court based its decision involving a Class III device to a large
extent on the Supreme Court's holding in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
209. 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989).
210. Id. at 247.
211. Id.
212. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995).
213. Moore, 867 F.2d at 247.
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Inc.214 In Cipollone, the plaintiff had lung cancer and brought suit
against cigarette manufacturers, asserting breach of warranty, failure to
warn, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to deprive the public
of important health information.215 The Supreme Court looked to the
explicit language of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
of 1965 that states that "[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smok-
ing and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the adver-
tising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this chapter. '216 The Court examined
each of the plaintiff's claims in light of the specific language of the statute,
which resulted in the holding that the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claims
were preempted as to advertising practices, but not as to testing or re-
search practices. 217 The fraudulent misrepresentation claim was also pre-
empted. 218 But the express warranty and conspiracy claims were not
preempted because the Court determined that these two claims did not
arise out of state law.219
The King court was guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Cipol-
lone not to expand the scope of preemption to an improper degree and,
specifically, not to extend it further than the language of the statute justi-
fied.220 The circuit court in King specifically voiced its intention to simi-
larly interpret the preemption provision applicable to medical devices
under the MDA. 22 '
In light of the Cipollone case, the King court purposely analyzed each
of Ms. King's claims individually. 222 As for the strict liability claim, the
court determined that "[s]ubsection (a) [of section 360c of the MDA] pro-
tects manufacturers of medical devices approved by the FDA under the
MDA from such state law intrusion. '223 The express warranty claims
based on the labeling and packaging of Zyderm were likewise considered
to infringe upon FDA regulation.224 The court dismissed the implied
warranty claims, stating that "[a]s an implied warranty is a requirement
upon a product that arises exclusively from the operation of state contract
law, this claim is preempted expressly by the MDA. ''225
The court also determined that the negligence claim was preempted by
the MDA. The court explained that "[i]f the MDA does nothing else, it
regulates the design, manufacture, sale and marketing of class III medical
214. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
215. Id. at 508.
216. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
217. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524-25.
218. Id. at 528.
219. Id. at 526-27, 530.
220. King, 983 F.2d at 1134.
221. Id.






devices in an extensive way."'226 Due to the express language of the
MDA providing that a pre-market application will not be accepted based
on false or misleading labeling, the court declared that the claims based
on inadequate labeling and packaging must fail because of FDA regula-
tion.227 King's final claim that Collagen Corporation obtained FDA pre-
market approval in a fraudulent manner failed, partly due to the ambigu-
ity in King's pleading, and partly due to the court's determination that the
fraud claim was a failure to warn claim.228 The concurring opinion in
King noted that, following the opinion of Cipollone, fraud found outside
the regulatory realm would not be subject to preemption. 229
An additional issue concerning the extent to which preemption applies
is the classification of a product as a drug rather than a device. For exam-
ple, debate surrounds the extent to which claims involving intrauterine
devices (IUDs) should be preempted. IUDs belong in the FDA-created
Class III category and are thus regulated under the MDA.230 Such regu-
lations require manufacturers of IUDs to warn consumers that the prod-
uct may cause pelvic inflammatory disease in some users.231 This is of
serious concern to consumers since the disease may cause adhesions to
build up along the walls of the reproductive organs, with possible damage
to the reproductive organs.232 Such damage can lead to ectopic (tubal)
pregnancy and infertility.233 Regardless of the warnings to consumers
concerning IUDs, some IUD users have brought lawsuits against the IUD
manufacturers on the premise that the warnings were not adequate. 234
Most of these IUD preemption cases have involved the Cu-7 IUD. The
Cu-7 is a plastic and copper IUD that emits small bits of copper into the
uterus.235 The copper irritates the lining of the uterus, and thus hinders
the implantation of the egg in the uterine wall. 236 The FDA approved the
Cu-7 in 1974 as a drug, not as a medical device. 237
Due to the classification of the Cu-7 as a drug rather than a medical
device, many courts have held that the preemptive language of the MDA
is not applicable to the Cu-7.238 For example, the court in Allen v. G.D.
Searle & Co. pointed to FDA regulations to illustrate that the FDA had
made distinctions among IUDs based on their classification as either
226. Id. at 1136.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1140.
230. 21 C.F.R. § 884.5360(b) (1995).
231. Id. § 801.427(b)(1) (1995).
232. See Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1145 (D. Or. 1989).
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 665 (D. Md. 1989); Allen,
708 F. Supp. at 1152; Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1029 (D.N.J. 1988);
Tarallo v. Searle Pharmaceutical, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 653, 660 (D.S.C. 1988); Kociemba v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1301 (D. Minn. 1988).
235. Ausness, supra note 120, at 229.
236. Spychala, 705 F. Supp. at 1026.
237. Allen, 708 F. Supp. at 1145.
238. Ausness, supra note 120, at 229.
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drugs or devices. 239 In particular, the Allen court cited FDA comments
which declared that "[t]he agency's policy of treating some IUDs as drugs
and others as devices is unaffected by the revised definition of device
found in the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, as amended by the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976."240 As a result, the court held that
section 360k does not expressly preempt state failure-to-warn claims
against the manufacturers of Cu-7 IUDs.241
A similar finding of non-preemption occurred in Callan v. G.D. Searle
& Co.242 In Callan, the court noted that the Cu-7, unlike plastic IUDs,
did not satisfy the statutory definition of a medical device since the Cu-7
depended in part on chemical means to accomplish its contraceptive ob-
jective. 243 Thus, the court held that section 360k of the MDA was inap-
plicable to the Cu-7 IUD.244
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I refer back to the King and Stamps cases, whose hold-
ings set out the issues analyzed in this Comment. Even though King and
Stamps are binding precedent only in federal courts within the First and
Fifth Circuits, respectively, these decisions are significant for both medi-
cal device manufacturers and consumers across the nation due to their
potential influence on courts in other jurisdictions.245 The United States
Supreme Court has denied certiorari in both cases; the Supreme Court,
however, may not be able to ignore an emerging split between the circuits
for much longer and may be forced to address this issue. 246
Manufacturers in the medical device industry, like those in all other
industries, face a difficult, if not impossible, task to ensure that every sin-
gle product is free from potential liability. In addition, manufacturers
cannot ensure that consumers correctly use the products, even when the
products are labeled in such a fashion as to facilitate safe and effective
use. In fact, it is a fair assumption to state that some amount of liability
risk is unavoidable for medical device manufacturers since by their very
nature the devices are associated, at least for now, with injuries and
death.247 The devices "therefore provide tempting targets for product lia-
bility plaintiffs and their lawyers .... To some degree, suits are inevita-
ble, and must be considered a cost of doing business in the United
239. Allen, 708 F. Supp. at 1151.
240. Id. (quoting 52 Fed. Reg. 23,772 (1977)).
241. Allen, 708 F. Supp. at 1151; see also Spychala, 705 F. Supp. at 1029; Tarallo, 704 F.
Supp. at 657.
242. Callan, 709 F. Supp. at 668.
243. Id at 666; see supra text accompanying note 5.
244. Callan, 709 F. Supp. at 666.
245. See Mark H. Lough, Recent Legal Developments Affecting Medical Device Manu-
facturers, 10 HEALTHSPAN 21 (1993).
246. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
247. Jeffrey N. Gibbs, Medical Device Promotional Activities and Private Litigation, 47




When considering this reality, the focus becomes how to minimize such
defects and thus how to protect public health and safety to the greatest
extent possible. The crucial issue centers upon the capabilities of the
FDA, notably whether the FDA, by imposing requirements across the
board for all states, can best achieve the federal objectives of public
health and safety. It has been stated that "[t]he basic justification for the
exercise of preemptive powers by Congress is the solution of major public
problems in the most effective and efficient manner."2 49 Is preemption a
near-perfect solution to major problems involving medical device regula-
tion? Or would something be gained by permitting states to impose addi-
tional guidelines without compromising the entire federal strategy
concerning medical device regulation, which includes the encouragement
of the marketing and development of new products and the need for
some sort of uniformity across the country? Is it possible for such state
standards to work in conjunction with those imposed at the federal level?
These are the questions at the heart of the preemption debate, and it is
these questions that must be considered when evaluating how medical
devices should be regulated in the United States.
I propose that any change in the status quo should begin with a modifi-
cation of the statutory language. I believe that express preemption
should be replaced with a rebuttable presumption of preemption. Such a
change could allow for state tort claims to stand, for example, if the ap-
proval process for medical devices could be undercut or undermined in a
way other than for which it was designed. The dismissal of the express
language is consistent with the need to account for flaws in the pre-mar-
ket approval process. Flaws are potentially present in a number of areas,
whether it is the entire design of the system that is defective, a system
that works well most of the time but occasionally breaks down, or a sys-
tem that is capable of being manipulated or perverted. Perhaps a combi-
nation of arguments for and against preemption could factor into a new
system by which claims involving medical devices are governed.
By changing the treatment of claims such as those brought in King and
Stamps from that of automatic dismissal to one involving a rebuftable
presumption, perhaps federal and state law could co-exist. Such a change
might decrease, if not eliminate, the tension involving the highly central-
ized regulation of medical devices by the federal government. It is no
secret that "[t]he optimal degree of centralization of political power in a
federal system is a subject of neverending controversy as dramatic
changes in... technology produce continuing pressures for readjustments
in the respective competencies of the national government and the
states. "250
248. Id.
249. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 80, at 14.
250. Id. at 3.
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By allowing a defendant manufacturer to rely to a great extent on the
fact that its products are FDA-approved and that preemption is pre-
sumed, manufacturers will not be disinclined to introduce and develop
new products for the benefit of the public. However, allowing this pre-
emption presumption to be rebuttable would provide the injured plaintiff
with recourse if he or she could prove that preemption should not be
permitted. This alternative takes the all-encompassing authority away
from the FDA, although the FDA would still have most of the regulatory
power regarding medical devices. Hopefully, the effect would be to push
the FDA to be even more cautious in its regulation of medical devices so
that courts would be reluctant to find that particular plaintiffs have rebut-
ted the preemption presumption. Thus, a plan based on qualified immu-
nity for manufacturers would still embody federal objectives but would
not automatically preclude plaintiffs in all circumstances from gaining
some relief from injuries or death resulting from defective medical
devices.
The question then arises under what circumstances a plaintiff would be
able to rebut the preemption presumption if such a plan were to be
adopted. For example, one argument is that a negligence standard, based
on an occasional flaw in the pre-market approval system, should be set.
An instance in which the negligence standard could help injured plaintiffs
would be when a manufacturer has misread injury reports. This scenario
would be a circumstance in which the plaintiff should be allowed to at-
tempt to rebut the preemption presumption. An even stronger argument
is that, if nothing else, a standard based on intentional tort should be
established. A prime example would be where a manufacturer has falsi-
fied data, suppressed injury reports, and so forth in the approval process.
Where fraud is involved in a device gaining FDA approval, the plaintiff
should be entitled to some sort of recourse against the manufacturer. The
overall rationale for a rebuttable presumption is that the FDA should not
want manufacturers to be immune from lawsuits involving devices that
should not have been FDA-approved in the first place, but nevertheless
passed the approval requirements due to fraudulent or negligent
behavior.
In conclusion, I propose that the preemptive language of the MDA be
modified in order to account for flaws in the pre-market approval process
for medical devices. A rebuttable presumption of preemption would not
hinder federal objectives such as the need for the development and mar-
keting of new products, and it would further the federal government's
overall objectives of public health and safety.
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